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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo statutory construction. First Amendment issues of law and
the deferential standard given to Congressional findings. Peretz v. U.S., 501 U.S. 923, 933
(1991), Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union ofU.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 525 (1984), Bartnicki v.
Vopper, aka Williams, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (“CPPA”), which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down as
unconstitutional, because it violated the First Amendment and was overbroad and vague.
Respondents include The Free Speech Coalition, a trade association of producers and distributors
of adult-oriented materials; Bold Type, Inc., a California publisher of a book on nude beaches;
Jim Gingferich, a New York artist of nude paintings; and Ron Raffaelli, a specialist in erotic
photography (collectively, “Free Speech”).
Free Speech originally brought suit against the Government in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on January 27,1997. (Joint Appendix (“ J. A.”) 1).
Free Speech brought the action to permanently enjoin the Government from enforcing certain
provision^ of the CPPA. (J.A. 1-2).
Free Speech based its challenge to the CPPA on three grounds: 1) the CPPA is not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest; 2) the terms “appears to be” and
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“conveys the impression” are unconstitutionally vague; and 3) the language of the CPPA is
unconstitutionally overbroad. (J.A. 4-7).
In response, the Government brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. (J.A. 70). On August 12,
1997, the District Court granted the Government’s motion. (J.A. 86). The District Court held
that the CPPA was neither content based, vague nor overbroad, and was not a prior restraint on
speech. Free Speech, 198 F.3d 1083, 1095. (9th Cir. 1999).
Free Speech appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on December 17,
1999. (J.A. 87). The Court of Appeals held that the CPPA violates the First Amendment
because it outlaws entirely fictional yet sexually explicit depictions of minors. Free Speech, 198
F.3d at 1083.
On January 31,2000 the Government filed a Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En
Banc which the Ninth Circuit denied on July 24, 2000. (J.A. 108); Free Speech, 198 F.3d at
1083. Free Speech responded to the Government’s Petition for Rehearing and Petition for
Rehearing En Banc on February 24, 2000. (J.A. 110). The Government filed for writ of
certioran''on November 16, 2000. (J.A. 114). This Court granted certiorari on January 22, 2001.
(J.A. 118).
Statement of Facts
In this case, the Court must decide whether the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (“CPPA”) violates the Constitution’s First and Fifth Amendments. (J.A. 2). Specifically,
because tl^e tenhs “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors ban sexually explicit
material of youthful looking adults or fictional characters. (J.A. 2-3). The CPPA does not define
or explain the meaning of “appear to be” or “conveys the impression” anywhere in the statute.
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Also, producers who do not use any minors face prosecution whenever law enforcement
determines that their material appears to promote or advertise minors. (J. A. 6). As a result,
Respondents have withheld distribution of their productions out of fear of prosecution. (J.A. 18,
20, 21, 23). Respondents also fear punishment for the mere possession of these materials. (J.A.
20.21,23).
1.

Prior and Existing Child Pornography Laws Protect Actual Children

Congress enacted the CPPA at the end of a series of legislative acts that regulate child
pornography. The initial legislation. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977 criminalized visual depictions of actual minors engaged in explicitly sexual conduct with
knowledge of its commercial use. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994). Congress enacted this statute
after finding that child pornography is "highly organized, highly profitable” and exploits
"countless numbers of real children in its production.” Free Speech, 198 F,3d at 1087. Soon
after, the Supreme Court ruled in N. Y. v. Ferber that to prevent child abuse, legislation may
prohibit dissemination of non-obscene sexually explicit depictions of minors. 458 U.S. 747,753
(1982).
Congress's numerous attempts to ban child pornography have proven inadequate.
Subsequently, along with the Supreme Court's mling in Ferber, Congress enacted a series of
laws designed to combat child abuse caused by their participation in child pornography. 198
F.3d at 1087-1089. In 1984, Congress made changes in the Child Protection Act that eliminated
the Miller v. Cal. obscenity standard, added a commercial distribution requirement, and raised
the age ofmindrity from sixteen to eighteen. 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253.
Then in 1988, after the 1986 recommendation of the Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography, Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act, which

3

required producers to create and maintain records of the identities and ages of the performers. 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251(A) (1994).
2.

The CPPA Departs Radically From Federal Law

From the outset of this legislative chain. Congress defined its objective in terms of the
protection of real children. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1089. In 1996, the CPPA marked a turning
point in which the law shifted from a ban on the use of actual children, to include for the first
time, youthful looking adults and computer-generated characters that appear to be minors. Id.
Congress discussed the issue of the CPPA’s constitutionality and ultimately ignored the warnings
of the CPPA’s possible unconstitutionality. (J.A. 52).
The Commissioner of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, Professor
Frederick Schauer, testified before Congress that the language in the CPPA of “appears to be”
raises Constitutional questions. (J.A. 52). Prof. Schauer is the Frank Stanton Professor of the
First Amendment at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and a visiting
professor of law at Harvard Law School. (J.A. 52). Schauer, the primary author of the report,
wrote in concurrence with over a dozen constitutional scholars about the unconstitutionality of
the status, and discussed the Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand the current provisions into
areas of new technology. (J.A. 52-53).
Several Senators agreed that this Court may find the CPPA unconstitutional. (J.A. 5161). As Senator Biden pointed out, after weighing a number of factors, the Ferber Court’s
paramount concern was to protect children from the harm of their participation in child
pornography, hot on the effect of the material on the viewer. (J.A. 52). Senator Feingold also
articulated the need to protect children forced to participate in child pornography. (J.A. 59). He
stated, however, that for laws that ban child pornography to have any value “they must remain
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within the permissible bounds of our Constitution.” (J.A. 59). Senator Feingold opposed the
CPPA because “unfortunately, as currently drafted, the underlying legislation ... fails to meet
this standard.” (J.A. 59).
The CPPA defines child pornography in relevant part as:
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means of sexually explicit conduct, where(A)

the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;

(B)

such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct;

(C)

such visual depiction has been created, adopted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or

(D)

such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed
in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct...

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. 1996).
Congress warned that this Court may strike down the CPPA as unconstitutional. To
defuse the anticipated constitutional objections to the CPPA, Congress included an affirmative
j
defense to the CPPA. This defense requires an accused person to prove: 1) the alleged child
pornography depicts an actual person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 2) each
such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and 3) the defendant did not
advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the
impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
>
conduct. Therefore, producers who can prove they only use adults in their material may still face
prosecution based on a subjective standard of the materials promotion or advertisment. (J.A. 6).
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In addition, this defense provides no defense at all to entirely computer-generated material
because,'by definition, such materials do not use actual persons in its production.

Respondents challenged the CPPA’s constitutionality on the grounds that it violated their
First Amendment rights. (J.A. 1-2). The District Court held that the CPPA was content-neutral
and was not vague or overbroad. Free Speech^ 198 F.3d at 1083. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the CPPA is a content-based restriction on speech and that the provisions “appears
to be” and “conveys the impression” of a minor violate the First Amendment because they are
vague and overbroad. Free Speech^ 198 F.3d at 1086. After an analysis of federal child
pornography legislation, the court determined that the CPPA represented a substantial departure
from previous laws. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1087-1090. The Ninth Circuit cited FerbeFs
holding that child pornography is illegal in order to prevent harm to the actual children present
during its production. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1092. The court concluded that the Government
failed to demonstrate this “critical ingredient” that links depictions of youthful looking adults
and fictional characters to child abuse. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1093.
3.

Parties Affected bv the CPPA

Free Speech is a trade association representing over 600 individuals and businesses in
defending their First Amendment rights. (J.A. 3). The Free Speech members produce,
distribute, present and sell non-obscene adult materials. (J.A. 3). These materials have so far
been in full compliance with statutory regulations. Despite this. Free Speech fears that the
CPPA’s language will leave some of its materials without constitutional protection. (J.A. 4).
Several n^embers of Free Speech have filed affidavits that they only use adults in their materials,
and yet, they fear prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A. 19-23).
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Free Speech members fear that their artistic expression of adult sexuality as portrayed in
photograiphs, films, television shows, books, magazines, and other artwork will wrongly subject
them to criminal prosecution. (J.A. 2). Specifically, Free Speech members contend that the
CPPA will unlawfully regulate as child pornography, images of youthful-looking adults and
fictional characters engaged in sexual conduct. (J.A. 5). In addition. Free Speech fears that the
CPPA will similarly target artificially generated images that do not involve minors in their
production. (J.A. 6).
Free Speech does not challenge 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A), which bans material depicting
actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, nor do they challenge § 2256(8)(C), which
bans computer generated images of identifiable children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
(J.A. 8). Free Speech opposes child pornography, and supports the Government in fighting the
exploitation of children. (J.A. 2). In fact, Free Speech and its members actively assist in the
eradication of child pornography. They offer, and have awarded in the past, cash rewards of up
to ten thousand dollars to any person who provides information that results in the arrest and
conviction of individuals involved in child pornography. (J.A. 3). Free Speech does not
advocate-or tolerate the production or distribution of child pornography involving real children.
Nevertheless, the CPPA threatens Free Speech and its members because they produce, distribute
and/or possess materials that do not use any minors, yet prosecutors may determine that they
portray minors involved in sexually explicit conduct. The penalty for violating the CPPA ranges
from a ten year prison term to execution. (J.A. 27).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should invalidate the provisions of the CPPA that criminalize any depiction
that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of minors engaging in sexually explicit
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conduct. This Court has stated that valid restrictions on protected speech do not refer “to the
content of the regulated speech ... are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.**
Clark V. Communityfor Creative Non-Violence^ 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The Government has
failed to demonstrate that the content-based restrictions the CPPA places on protected speech
serve a significant state interest, that the CPPA is narrowly tailored, or that it provides for
alternative methods of expression.
The Ferber Court strictly delineated the boundaries that constitute child pornography
because restricting content-based speech in pursuit of a compelling Government interest requires
a sensitive balancing test. 458 U.S. 747, 764. The Government pushes the Court’s established
boundaries by restricting speech protected by the First Amendment. This Court defined the
boundaries of unprotected speech based on the Constitution’s concern that individuals, not the
Government, form and express “esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature.”
US V. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). Specifically, this Court stated that
[tjechnology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we
assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.” Id. Because the
Government has not demonstrated a compelling interest in restricting this speech, it treads on
constitutionally protected rights by restricting the production of material because it disapproves
of the content. Furthermore, even if the Government could demonstrate a compelling state
interest in restricting this speech, the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to address this interest, and
therefore places a unconstitutionally categorical ban on protected speech.
For the same reasons the Government cannot demonstrate a compelling state interest in
restricting this speech, the terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are
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unconstitutionally overbroad. These terms render a blanket suppression on First Amendment
protected speech, which bans sexually explicit visual depictions that may appear to be minors to
some, but that are entirely fictional or that portray youthful looking adults. Several members of
Congress also expressed concern for the CPPA’s encroachment on First Amendment rights at the
time of its enactment. The CPPA further threatens these rights because it provides an affirmative
defense that is unfair and ineffective because it necessarily excludes entire classes of artists and
distributors from using the defense at all.
The provisions “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” also fail constitutionality
for vagueness because they are not defined and do not give the ordinary person or law
enforcement officials notice of prohibited conduct. For this reason, the CPPA’s vagueness
violates due process laws because of its failure to provide fair notice. As a result, these terms
permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. Finally, the CPPA’s vagueness
and overbreadth renders the statute ineffective and delays the protection of children.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CPPA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE PROVISIONS OF “APPEARS
TO BE” AND “CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION” BAN AN ENTIRE CATEGORY OF
PROTECTED SPEECH.
As currently written, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) bans the

sexually explicit portrayal of adults who appear younger than eighteen and artificially generated
images. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). In doing so, the CPPA violates the First and Fifth
Amendments by banning an entire category of protected speech. The First Amendment states
that “Coi^ress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend, I.
The CPPA provisions abridge the freedom of speech by restricting sexually explicit images that
are not child pornography as established by the leading case oiN.Y, v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 764
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(1982). The Court in Ferber created a new form of unprotected speech, and in this case, the
Government attempts to force these legal images of adults, or fictional characters, into that
narrow category. 458 U.S. at 764.
A.

The Government Does Not Have a Compelling Interest in Banning Non~Obscene
Sexually Explicit Materials That Do Not Involve Actual Children.

The CPPA, unlike the statute in Ferber^ is an unconstitutional content based restriction
because it does not respond to a compelling state interest. The Government here fails to show
the CPPA’s justification “without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Clark v.
Communityfor Creative Non-Violence^ 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding de minimis intrusions
on speech acceptable as long as they are tailored to serve a substantial government interest and
do not umeasonably limit alternative channels of communication). For the CPPA to validly
restrict speech in compliance with the Constitution, the Government must demonstrate that the
restriction has nothing to do with the speech’s message. Id. The Government’s failure to
demonstrate that the CPPA is content neutral renders it “presumptively invalid.” R.A. V. Petr. v.
City ofSt. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding, as facially unconstitutional, an
ordinance not narrowly tailored to further the compelling government interest of protecting the
j
public safety and community against discriminating threats).
The content neutrality test questions whether the statute is narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling government interest through the least restrictive means. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. The
Government has not met its burden for two reasons. First, the Government has not established a
compelling interest that would allow it to restrict Free Speech’s material. No evidence exists in
the recorcf that sexually explicit, non-obscene material produced without children has any effect
on children. This Court requires a clear nexus between the restricted speech, and the harm that it
supposedly causes. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (holding that an
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ordinance restricting adult theatres satisfies the content-neutral requirements because it serves a
substantial government interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication). Second, even if the government demonstrated a state interest, the statute is not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, and therefore fails strict scrutiny.
When the Government has a compelling state interest, such as a legitimate interest to
maintain children’s safety and welfare, that interest may supercede rights protected by the First
Amendment. Ferber^ 458 U.S. at 763. This Court stated in Ferber that when a defined category
of material harms the children used in its production, the First Amendment does not protect that
material. 458 U.S. at 764. In doing so, this Court created an exception to constitutionally
protected speech for child pornography. In this case, the production of these materials do not
involve children, so they do not fall within the exception, and remain constitutionally protected.
The de minimis value of using minors in sexually explicit material does not apply to
material that does not involve minors. The Government has failed to show that any harm results
from non-obscene sexually explicit material that does not involve children. The Ferber Court
suggested that instead of involving children in sexually explicit literary or artistic performances,
“a persori* over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger” could perform when necessary.
458 U.S. at 763. The non-obscene sexually explicit portrayal of youthful looking adults has
value, such as for artistic, literary, scientific or educational purposes. Id. Free Speech uses
artificially generated images or adults to convey their artistic expressions, in accordance with the
reasoning of Ferber. Id.
Irijtheir concurring opinion, Justices Breiman and Marshall point out that stretching the
facts of Ferber even slightly would violate First Amendment rights. 458 U.S. at 776. They
explained that, “in the absence of exposure, or particular harm, to juveniles or unconsenting
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adults, the State lacks power to suppress sexually oriented materials.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 111.
Similarly here, the Government has failed to identify a specific or “particular harm” to children,
and yet attempts to restrict a broad category of protected speech.
B.

Tlie Reasons in Support of the Argument That These Materials Lead to Sexual
Abuse of Children Are Unfounded.

To get around the CPPA’s unconstitutionality. Congress argues that the CPPA aims not
to restrict Free Speeches material, but rather to combat the secondary effects caused by this
material. (J.A. 30). Congress bases this argument on the extensive facts that link child
pornography to child abuse, and on the judicial reasoning of this Court in N. Y. v. Ferber. (J.A.
35). However, the Ferber Court aimed primarily to protect children involved in child
pornography from abuse, as it reiterated many times in the opinion. 458 U.S. at 757-759, 761,
764. The Court in Ferber specifically addressed the harm to children used in child pornography,
and the intrinsic relationship between child pornography and child abuse requires that the visual
depictions involve actual children. 458 U.S. at 759. Congress has not provided any evidence
linking non-obscene sexually explicit materials that do not involve children with sexually abuse
of children.
j
Congress claims a nexus between sexually explicit materials that appear to involve
children, but do not, and the actions of people who would exploit children. Free Speech^ 198
F.3d at 1091. Congress, however, has not proven its claim that the harms to children making
child pornography occur in other forms of protected sexual expression produced entirely without
children. Even if a nexus between virtual pornography and harm to children existed, the
t
Government targets the “potential conduct” of pedophiles, and fails to justify a categorical ban
on adult forms of expression protected by the First Amendment. (J.A. 39). This Court stated
that the Govenunent caimot restrict speech simply to prevent “anticipated harms,” but rather
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“must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. F. C. C.,
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). To prevent child abuse, Congress must target illegal conduct, and not
categorically ban protected expression because it might cause harm.
Unlike Ferher, where the Court addressed an actual problem, here the Government
searches for a problem to justify a categorical ban. The Court in Ferber expressly stated that the
use of children in pornography “is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of
the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.” 458 U.S.
at 758. The Court requires the nexus between the ban on child pornography, and children’s
safety, which the Government cannot demonstrate in the current situation that does not involve
children.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Government’s claim that any response pedophiles may
have to images that “appear to be” of minors justifies the CPPA’s restriction on speech. Free
Speech, 198 F.3d at 1093. The court found that it unconstitutional to ban as child pornography,
“foul figments of creative technology that do not involve any human victim in their creation or in
their pres5!ntation.” Id. No evidence exists that shows a correlation between technological
images and any affect on children. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[ajbsent this
nexus, the law does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.” Free Speech, 198 F. 3d at 1094.
1.

There is no basis for the argument that sexually explicit materials that
portray youthful looking adults or artificially generated images whet the
sexual appetites of pedophiles.

Tlw Government also attempts to argue that sexually explicit material produced without
actual could potentially harm children because pedophiles will use the material to seduce
children, and to stimulate their appetites. (J.A. 40). This Court has already stated that
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“[IJisteners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects* we referred to in Renton,'
and furthermore “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.*’*
Boos V. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). Consequently, this argument fails to bolster the
Government’s claim of compelling interest to prevent a secondary effect.
The argument that pedophiles will abuse this material to harm children fails constitutional
scrutiny for two additional reasons. First, nothing indicates that pedophiles use these materials to
seduce children or to whet their appetites. The Government cannot pronounce this material
“virtually indistinguishable” from child pornography. (J.A. 38). Second, this argument applies
to any material, including sexually explicit non-obscene portrayals of adults as well as nonsexual depictions of children. Affirming this argument would lead to a ban on any speech that
potentially has negative consequences.
In her concurring opinion in Berber, Justice O’Connor raised the possibility “that New
York’s statute is overbroad because it bans depictions that do not actually threaten the harms
identified by the Court.” 458 U.S. at 775. Likewise, the CPPA bans images that do not cause
the harms of child pornography. This Court has recently stated that regulating content based
speech 'vWth the purpose of shielding “the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the
right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.” U.S. v. Playboy
Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). In that case, the Government failed to prove that the
content-based statute was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling Government interest, and
because a less restrictive alternative existed, this Court held the statute violated the First
Amendment. Playboy,529 U.S. at 827.
j
Allowing Congress to prohibit speech based on what a listener might to with that speech
goes directly against the First Amendment. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 812. The Ninth Circuit
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determined that “[m]any innocent things can entice children into immoral or offensive behavior,
but that reality does not create a constitutional power in the Congress to regulate otherwise
innocent behavior.” Free Speech^ 198 F.3d at 1094. According to the Government’s argument,
this creates a slippery slope making popular films, magazines or even clothing catalogues illegal
because they might entice a child to do something that others may find objectionable. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the CPPA criminalizes “disavowed impulses of the mind,” as manifest in
“illicit creative acts” and concluded that “censorship through the enactment of criminal laws
intended to control an evil idea cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the First
Amendment.” Free Speech^ 198 F.3d at 1094.
2.

The economic motive that furthers child pornography does not pertain to
materials that do not depict actual children.

Congress should limit the CPPA to protect children, instead of making the lawful conduct
of law-abiding adults illegal. The Government argues for expanding the ban on child
pornography to prevent virtual images of sexuality fi-om becoming a form of currency to trade
for child pornography. Congress, however, doesn’t have the power to ban money or credit cards
because they are exchanged for child pornography. Likewise, Congress cannot outlaw
j
constitutionally protected speech because of the possibility that a person will trade it for illegal
material. A law already forbids people from selling child pornography, including computer
generated images of identifiable children. (J.A. 34). This law, and others, criminalize the sale of
pornography without violating the First Amendment. (J.A. 34). Congress should make the
transaction’s conduct illegal, not the lawful expression of ideas.
I
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3.

Shifting the burden to defendants to prove their innocence is scarcely
compelling.

The Government argues that without these provisions of the CPPA, prosecutors will have
difficulty proving whether a particular image used an actual child in its production, letting people
who do produce images with actual children get away with it. (J.A. 39). This argument fails for
two reasons. First, no evidence exists that if prosecutors fail to meet their evidentiary burden in
cases where no child appears in the production, pedophiles will increase their abuse and more
children will suffer. Second, reducing the Government’s burden of proof cannot justify a
categorical ban on protected speech.
The Government’s argument about the difficulty of their burden does not hold. Even if
the Government had evidence of cases where a defendant escaped conviction because
prosecutors could not meet their burden, that does not justify a total suppression of all sexually
explicit material that depicts images that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of minors.
Congress should have focused on honing the defenses available to defendants in child
pornography cases, and not on the suppression of First Amendment protected speech.
Further, Congress cannot shift the burden to the defendant to prove his or her innocence.
j
The Government’s attempt to reduce its burden is hardly a compelling argument because it shifts
the burden to the defendant. U.S. v. Jacobson^ 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992) (holding that a
compelling interest in protecting children from sexual abuse does not justify altering the general
rules of criminal procedure).
C.

Even if the Interest to Ban Non-Obscene Sexually Explicit Materials That Do Not
Involve Children Were Compelling, the CPPA Fails Constitutionality Because It
Is Not Narrowly Tailored.

The Court applies the strict scrutiny standard to content-based statutes, like the CPPA.

Playboy^ 529 U.S. at 813. In Playboy^ the Court determined that because a regulation burdened

16

speech, “the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the secondary effects of crime or
declining property values has no application to content-based regulations targeting the primary
effects of protected speech.” 529 U.S. at 815. Therefore, the Playboy Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard. Id. Similarly here, the Government cannot prove that the CPPA is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling Government interest, and it therefore fails strict scrutiny.
The CPPA is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored. In reaching its
conclusion in Ferber^ this Court focused on the clearly defined boundaries that rendered child
pornography, like obscenity, unprotected by the First Amendment. 458 U.S. at 764. In this case,
the CPPA does not clearly define the material it restricts, nor are the provisions narrowly tailored
to cover a certain category of speech.
The clear line separating child pornography from other materials blurs when the
government attempts to regulate materials simply because they contain youthful looking adults,
or artificially generated images. The infringement of government regulation on free speech
limits the free exchange of ideas, the very foundation of American ideals. The Ferber Court
primarily concerned itself with the difficulty, “not only to assure that statutes designed to
regulate ^scene materials sufficiently defined what was prohibited, but also to devise
substantive limits on what fell within the permissible scope of regulation.” 458 U.S. at 755. The
Court fears that “[l]ike obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemination of child
pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor
to become unduly heavy.” Ferber^ 458 U.S. at 756,
II.

THE CPPA’S BLANKET SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED
SPEECH RENDERS THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
The CPPA currently bans sexually explicit material that the First Amendment protects.

Specifically, the CPPA outlaws material that uses no actual children, but may incorporate
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sexually explicit images of youthfiil-Iooking adults or entirely fictional characters. This Court
banned depictions of child sexuality because of the harm children suffer during its making.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. Therefore, the CPPA bans material that this Court has never before
considered child pornography. Several members of Congress also expressed concern for the
CPPA’s constitutionality at the time of its enactment. The CPPA has an ineffective affirmative
defense because it provides no defense for many whose work or possessions may fall under the
statute. For these reasons, the CPPA is facially and substantially overbroad.
A.

The CPPA Is Substantially Overbroad Because It Bans Sexually Explicit Visual
Depictions That Are Entirely Fictional or That Portray Youthful Looking Adults.

Currently the CPPA bans entirely constitutional material. The Government’s argument
that the CPPA bans only those materials that are “virtually indistinguishable” from child
pornography fails because the “virtually indistinguishable” language appears nowhere in the
statute. (J.A. 38). This term appears only in the general findings of the statute included as one
of the historical and statutory notes contained in the annotated version of the United States Code,
Jd. This Court held that relying on language outside of a statute to explain its requirements does
not provide a strong basis for its definition. Natl. Org.for Women v. Scheidler^ 510 U.S. 249
(1994) (‘’The quoted statement of legislative findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base a
requirement”). Therefore, the CPPA’s plain language does not sufficiently narrow the statute to
material that is “virtually indistinguishable” fi'om child pornography.
The CPPA’s reach is substantially and facially overbroad because it bans “any visual
depiction” that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a minor. 18 U.S.C. § 2256{8)(B),
(D). Relying on this language of the statute, the CPPA expressly bans a broad range of images
that are not “virtually indistinguishable” from child pornography. The CPPA’s subsections
2256(8) A through D all refer to “visual depictions” yet this language actually contradicts the
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“virtually indistinguishable” language the Government relies on to narrow the law. 18 U S C
§ 2256(8)(B), (D), The CPPA includes the broader of these terms “visual depiction” in its plain
language, while it omits the narrower “virtually indistinguishable” term. (J.A. 38). The
Government’s reliance on a term not within the CPPA to narrow it, highlights that the CPPA’s
language is not sufficiently narrow. 18 U.S.C. § 2256{8)(B), (D), The Government’s statement
that the CPPA applies to material “virtually indistinguishable” firom child pornography cannot be
true if the statute applies only to sexually explicit“visual depiction” that “appears to be” or
“conveys the impression” of a minor. Id.
Specifically, several of the CPPA’s provisions ban material that this Court does not
consider child pornography. For example, subsection 2256(8)(B) bans sexual depictions of
adults or fictional characters who “appear to be” minors and subsection 2256(8)(D) bans
depictions of actual adults that producers may appear to promote as minors. In banning these
materials the CPPA bans the material this Court protected in Ferber, because the CPPA bans far
more than materials that harm children. 458 U.S. at 777. The CPPA’s current construction
applies to countless types of film, sculpture, photography, paintings, illustrations, and even to
depictions of anatomically correct dolls. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (holding the
CDA’s “indecent” and “patently offensive” terms ban non-pomographic material with serious
educational value). Similarly, the CPPA bans serious literary, artistic, scientific, and educational
materials that are neither obscene nor harmful to children. For example, the CPPA includes
within its reach such iimocuous films as Lolita, Blue Lagoon, or Titanic, and historical texts with
illustrations like the Karma Sutra. In addition, the CPPA’s current sweep may allow law
enforcement to arrest and prosecute the producers of an educational film about child sexual
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abuse or the authors of medical literature containing visual depictions of minors engaged in
sexual conduct.
The CPPA’s overbroad sweep includes the potential prosecution of non-obscene
depictions of sexual acts that do not involve a real child in any way. This Court banned child
pornography because of the harm caused by its creation, and not for any of its consequences.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 777. For this reason, the CPPA’s overbreadth is unconstitutional because it
prohibits material that this Court gives First Amendment protection to, in particular, “nonobscene sexual expression that does not involve actual children.” Id.
The logical extension of the Government’s argument to ban virtual expressions of child
sexuality, even when it only involves adults or entirely fictional characters, extends to a ban of
any expression that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a specific crime. This grant
of power allows the Government to prosecute crimes in movies or plays that are entirely
simulated and during which no one is harmed in any way. For example, under this broadreaching discretion, the Government may prosecute the producers of the film Pulp Fiction for the
harm of promoting the use of illegal drugs, or a production of Othello for the harm of promoting
domesticjviolence and murder. The practical nullification of our First Amendment rights that
these scenarios illustrate, demonstrates the troubling effect of the CPPA’s overbreadth.
The CPPA’s Congressional Findings Emphasize a Concern for Its
Constitutionality Because It Is Overbroad and Directly Contravenes This Court’s
Ruling in Fp.rhp.r
The legislative record on the CPPA demonstrates that members of Congress themselves
expressed concern about the statute’s constitutionality due to its overbreadth. (J.A. 34, 52-61).
r

According to Senator Kennedy, substantial evidence exists “to believe that the underlying bill is
unconstitutional as applied to the depiction of adults, or as applied to computer-generated images
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1

of fictitious children.” (J.A. 56). Senator Simon voted to oppose the statute because of its
unconstitutional overbreadth. (J.A. 57).
Specifically, the Congressional record reflects a concern, that the CPPA outlaws material
that in no way uses a real child for their production. (J.A. 52). Senator Biden stated how this
aspect of the CPPA directly contradicts this Court’s holdings “by criminalizing all visual
depictions that ‘appear to be* child pornography—even if no child is ever used or harmed in its
production—section 4 prohibits the very type of depictions that the Supreme Court has explicitly
held protected.” (J.A. 52). The CPPA contradicts this Court’s reasoning in Ferber, which limits
the prosecution of child pornography to visual depictions of actual children specifically to avoid
the sexual abuse of children during its production. 458 U.S. at 762. However, much of the
material the CPPA bans necessarily does not involve child abuse because there are no actual
children in the material. The CPPA’s scope reaches much farther than this Court deems
constitutional.
C.

The CPPA’s Affirmative Defense Is Unfair and Ineffective Because It
Necessarily Excludes Entire Classes of Artists. Producers, and Individuals
From Using the Defense. Even When Their Material Falls Within the Statute.

Xhe CPPA’s affirmative defense provides no defense at all for various types of sexually
explicit material that may look like they contain minors, including entirely fictional depictions or
images of actual adults that appear to advertise images of minors. The CPPA’s provides an
affirmative defense if: 1) the alleged child pornography depicts an actual person or persons
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 2) each such person in the material was an adult at the
time of production; and 3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(C).
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The affirmative defense’s requirement that producers or distributors prove that their
material uses actual adults provides no defense for those who produce entirely fictional
depictions. For example, Respondent Jim Gingerich who creates works that use no actual people
and are the sole product of his imagination, cannot use this defense. (J.A. 3). Similarly, the
defense does no protect producers and distributors of entirely computer-generated material that
does not depict any identifiable people, but that are again, complete fabrications. The CPPA’s
affirmative defense is unfair and illogical because an artist that uses only a computer to produce
an image may face a fifteen-year prison term under the statute, while a photographer who
produces a similar image using an actual person will not. (J.A. 27).
In addition, the affirmative defense does not protect consumers and distributors that have
no involvement in the production any material that the CPPA bans and that consequently, have
no way of knowing the age of persons depicted or whether they are actual persons at all. Also,
the CPPA applies to all material that law enforcement may find, without providing any temporal
parameters for the prosecution of producers or possessors of such material. As a result, any
material produced before its enactment is not exempt from penalty under the statute.
Tfie affirmative defense further limits its already weak application because it does not
protect all producers or distributors who can prove that they use actual adults in their material.
The final provision of the defense does not provide a defense to defendants who only use actual
adults, but whose product appears to “advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the
material in such a manner as to convey the impression of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”, 18 iJ.S.C. § 2252(C)(3). Once again, the CPPA does not provide any guidance on
how to determine that producers who only use actual adults in their material, promote or
advertise it to involve minors. Also, the CPPA uses the undefined and overbroad term “convey
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the impression” another time to describe a crime whose penalty extends to a fifteen-year prison
term. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(C)(3).
Another troubling provision of the CPPA’s affirmative defense states that the defense
does not apply to those who have more than three sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors. (J.A. 27). Yet again, this defense is useless to many producers, distributors, and even
individuals who may possess large quantities of sexually explicit conduct that may violate the
statute based on the personal opinion of a law enforcement official. For example, this provision
does not provide a defense for Respondent Bold Type Inc., whose books on nudism might appear
to depict minors to some, nor to Respondents Gingerich and Raffaelli whose paintings or
photographs all may be misconstrued to depict minors. (J.A. 3). Individuals may not use the
affirmative defense either under this provision because it applies to the public at large. An
individual may face prosecution if officials find more than three books or films in a personal
collection that may appear to depict minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. This
provision does not provide a secure defense for those who do possess three or fewer items either
because they must destroy or forfeit their items in order to avoid prosecution.
III.

THE PROVISIONS “APPEARS TO BE” AND “CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION”
ALSO FAIL FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT GIVE THE PUBLIC OR
LAW ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT.
The CPPA is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define to whom material must

appear to or convey the impression of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. These
provisions are inherently subjective because they fail to define a clear criminal offense. The
CPPA*s vagueness violates due process laws by its failure to provide fair notice and permits
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. The CPPA’s vagueness also has the
effect to chill entirely protected speech out of fear of prosecution.
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A.

The CPPA’s Terms “Appears To Be** and “Conveys The Imprcssion”Are
Unconstitutionally Vague Because They Fail to Expressly Define Any Criminal
Offense.

The CPPA's subsections 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8){D) are vague because the
terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” give no guidance to the ordinary person
about the conduct the statute prohibits. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). A statute is
unconstitutionally vague based on an objective standard when it does not clearly define a
criminal offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited” Kolender v. Lawsoriy 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983). No ordinary person can
understand the prohibited conduct of the CPPA because it does not identify any explicit offense,
nor who or what determines which material “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a
minor. The CPPA’s failure to define these basic terms is sufficiently vague because it leaves this
cmcial question entirely open-ended and provides no guidance to the ordinary citizen.
The CPPA does not provide a single standard by which to determine what “appears to
be” or “conveys the impression” of a minor, nor does the statute refer to any standard established
by this Court. Free Speech, 198 F.3d at 1083. The absence of a standard to determine the age
someone dppears to be further emphasizes the statute’s vagueness, because the appearance of
age, like beauty, is subjectively in the eye of the beholder.
Even if the CPPA did provide a standard to determine age, the question would remain as
to whose standards apply. An objective standard cannot apply because it does not resolve the
issue of who determines that material “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a minor.
Reasonable persons will differ on the issue of what a minor looks like and disparities in the
statute’s enforcement will result. The use of community standards will also lead to a highly
inconsistent enforcement of the CPPA that is not, in fact, objective at all. Standards differ

24

significantly from community to community. Cultural, ethmc, and political differences all shape
one’s perception of what a minor looks like. The disparities present in how to determine what
‘‘appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a minor by any standard highlight the vagueness
of the CPPA’s provisions.
The terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are inherently subjective terms
to which an objective standard cannot apply. No objective standard exists to determine the
appearance of age. These terms, however, are inherently subjective when applied to any kind of
determination, because they rely entirely on perceptions for which there are no guidelines. This
Court held that inherently subjective terms are unconstitutionally vague. City of Chi v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (holding “no apparent purpose” standard used to define loitering was
“inherently subjective” because it relied solely on the officer at the scene to determine whether a
purpose is “apparent” or not). Similarly, the terms “appears to be and conveys the impression
are inherently subjective because they also rely solely on the law enforcement officers who first
view material to determine whether it “appears to be or conveys the impression of a minor.
The Government argues that the CPPA is not vague because it criminalizes material that
is “virtually indistinguishable” from child pornography to the “unsuspecting viewer” although
these phrases appear nowhere in the statute. (J.A. 40). The Government’s need to use words not
in the statute to describe its meaning greatly emphasize the statute’s unclear terms and its failure
to define these terms. Nevertheless, the phrase “virtually indistinguishable” does not clarify the
terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” because again it only describes yet another
subjective^determination. Also the term “unsuspecting viewer” emphasizes the statute’s
subjectivity because there is no guidance to help determine the “unsuspecting viewer.” This
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standard cannot be equivalent to the reasonable person of the objective standard, otherwise there
is no need for a separate standard. For these reasons, the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague.
B.

Due to Its Vagueness the CPPA is Unconstitutional Because It Fails to Provide
Fair Notice in Violation of Due Process Laws.

The CPPA violates due process laws due to the vagueness of the terms “appears to be”
and “conveys the impression.” (“The Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.”) In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A vague statute
violates due process because it does not clearly identity the basis of conviction to those who may
be vulnerable to its provisions. Osborne v. OA/o, 495 U.S. 103, 119(1990). Accordingly,
statutes “so vague that prosecuting a person under the statute would effectively deprive that
person of due process of law” is unconstitutional. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58.
The CPPA’s terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” violate due process
because the trier of fact under the statute will have to rely on a highly subjective assessment of
what material appears to be depict. As discussed, separate communities are likely to vary in their
perceptions of what appears to depict a minor, indeed, separate individuals are likely to vary on
the issue also. Law enforcement officials, juries, and judges must determine whether material
“appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of a minor solely on their personal sense of the
images. The CPPA’s violation of due process laws strongly affects the public as well, because
the statute amends former Federal law to increase penalties for its offenders. (J.A. 30). For this
reason, the CPPA does not provide fair warning to those who may unintentionally violate it and
face a potential ten-year prison term. (J.A. 27).
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C.

The Vagueness of the CPPA^s Terms “Appears To Be** And “Conveys
The Impression” Permit Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement of the Statute.

The CPPA’s failure to provide precise definitions or standards to apply defers the
statute’s meaning to public officials and results in law officials having unfettered discretion in
the arrest and prosecution of individuals under the statute. No other standard exists for a clear
definition of these terms. The reliance on individual law enforcement officers to determine what
an image depicts will lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. As a result,
law enforcement officials are the only authority that can determine which material falls under the
statute and they will determine this entirely on their subjective impressions. Consequently,
officials will enforce the CPPA inconsistently because its enforcement is entirely discretionary.
The vagueness of a statute raises special constitutional concerns because of its “obvious chilling
effect on free speech.” Reno^ 521 U.S. at 872. Severe criminal penalties are likely to cause the
public, in particular artists, to self-censor their own speech, ideas, or images. Id. This deterrent
effect, along with a high risk of discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement, poses a serious threat
to First Amendment rights. Id. The CPPA’s vague provisions pose this serious threat on all
artistic, scjentific, and educational communities, as well as on the public at large.
IV.

THE CPPA IS INEFFECTIVE AND DELAYS THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN BECAUSE IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND
OVERBROAD.
A statute designed to protect children that contains vague and overbroad language only

serves to counter that aim due to its in effectiveness. According to Senator Biden, “Enacting a
statute of questionable constitutionality is counterproductive to the strict enforcement of laws
t

against pedophiles and child molesters.” (J.A. 53). Specifically, the CPPA’s vague and
overbroad language will result in the delay of its enforcement due to litigation on its
constitutionality. (J.A. 53).
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In addition, many resources that exist to help combat child pornography are wasted on
determining the constitutionality of the CPPA. (J.A. 53). Narrowing the CPPA can better
protect children by preserving government resources, and saving time. Until then, the vagueness
and overbreadth of the CPPA’s terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” delay the
protection of children due to their unconstitulionality. In order to protect children more swiftly
and effectively the CPPA must clearly define the criminal offenses it outlaws.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this Court AFFIRM the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Dated: October 31, 2001

Respectfully submitted.

Counsel for Respondents
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